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Labour legislation was introduced into agriculture in the early 1990s with the Basic
Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) being gazetted in 1992. Since the mid-1990s "new"
labour legislation pertaining to agriculture has been implemented in South Africa, and
includes the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (amended), the Unemployment
Insurance Act 63 of 2001 (amended), the Labour Relations Act (LRA) 66 of 1995, the Land
Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997,
the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the Skills Development Levies Act 9 of 1999, and
the Sectoral Determination (an amendment of the BCEA 75 of 1997) which includes the
imposition of minimum wages. This study examines the legislation in detail as well as the
implications of this legislation .for agricultural labour employment in South Africa. A
relative increase in the cost (transaction and wage) and risk associated with labour motivates
farmers to replace labour with machinery, machinery contractors, labour contractors or new
technologies that are labour-saving. This results in a decrease in the demand for unskilled
workers and higher levels of poverty and unemployment in South Africa.
This study estimates long-run price elasticities of demand for regular labour in South African
(SA) agriculture using both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and a Two-stage Least
Squares (2SLS) simultaneous equations model. The 2SLS model includes a labour supply
equation. Secondary data obtained over a 43 year period (1960-2002) from Statistics South
Africa and the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics were used in this study. Both models were
estimated for the period 1960-2002, and included a piecewise slope dummy variable for
wages with the threshold year taken as 1991 to reflect expected changes in farm labour
legislation. Study results show that the estimated long-run price elasticity of demand for
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labour for the pre-1991 (i.e., 1960-1990) period was -0,25 for the OLS model and -0,23 for
the 2SLS model suggesting that the demand for regular labour was.jnelastic during this
period. For the post-1991 period (1991-2002), the long-run elasticity was estimated as -1,32
for the OLS model and -1,34 for the 2SLS model. This shows a structural change in demand
that questions the appropriateness of minimum wage and other labour legislation that has
raised the cost of regular farm labour in South Africa.
Labour legislation introduced in the early 1990s encouraged farmers to substitute casual
workers for regular workers. However, the inclusion of all casual workers in minimum wage
legislation from 2006 is expected to slow the casualisation of agricultural labour as farmers
turn to labour contractors, chemicals and machinery as the next best substitutes. The study
found that an increase (decrease) in the price of chemicals (pesticides and herbicides for
crops, and labour saving dips and sprays for animals) result in an increase (decrease) in the
demand for regular labour. The demand for labour is also sensitive to changes in real interest
rates (used as a proxy for machinery costs). The cost of capital would decrease (increase) as
interest rates fall (rise), resulting in farmers adopting more (less) machinery and equipment,
causing a decrease (increase) in the demand for regular labour, ceteris paribus.
In order to reverse the regular labour unemployment trend in SA agriculture, government
could choose to adopt more flexible labour market regulations (i.e., legislation regarding the
hiring and dismissing of farm workers, and increases in wages and benefits for the farm
worker could be based on the individual performance of each worker as opposed to
increasing the wages of the entire workforce through minimum wages) which would reduce
labour costs and encourage fanners to employ more labour.
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INTRODUCTION
Agriculture is a major employer of South African (SA) labour with about 9,8% of the total
labour force directly involved in agricultural production (Statistics South Africa, 2005). The
supply of labour to agriculture in South Africa is relatively price elastic due to the high
percentage of unemployed people (Nieuwoudt, 1984) - the formal unemployment rate in
South Africa was about 26,5% in 2005 (Statistics South Africa, 2005). The demand for
labour is also expected to be price elastic as there are many substitutes for farm labour, such
as machinery and contractors (Goedecke and Ortrnann, 1993).
Since the mid-1990s "new" labour legislation pertaining to agriculture has been implemented
in South Africa, and includes the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 75 of 1997
(amended), the Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 (amended) , the Labour Relations
Act 66 of 1995, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, the Extension of Security
of Tenure Act 62 of 1997, the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the Skills Development
Levies Act 9 of 1999 and the Sectoral Determination (an amendment of the BCEA 75 of
1997) which provides for the imposition of minimum wages. A relative increase in the cost
of labour encourages farmers to replace labour with machinery, machinery contractors,
labour contractors or new technologies that are labour-saving. Significant unemployment
will result if demand for labour is very price elastic (Lianos, 1972;Conradie, 2005) and
output will fall due to an increase in production costs (Burton et al., 1970). Labour
legislation was introduced in South Africa with the objective of improving labour
productivity and stability in the economy. More recently, however, minimum wages have
been used as a poverty alleviation tool among farm workers (Vink and Tregurtha, 2003).
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Expectations of changes to labour legislation as part of political reform in South Africa may
have resulted in reduced labour employment prior to the mid-1990s. Higher rates for
overtime work, shortened working hours, lengthened maternity leave, UIF contributions,
higher transaction costs owing to regulations governing dismissal and leave benefits,
increased risk of industrial action, and more recently (2003) increases in minimum wages in
real terms have led to an increase in labour cost and, therefore, substitution of regular farm
labour in South Africa.
The number of paid workers employed by the formal agricultural sector decreased by
174545 (15,7%) from 1 115 365 in 1991 to 940820 in 2002*. Casual workers (i.e., seasonal
and domestic workers employed on farms) accounted for 36% of agricultural employees in
1991 (Statistics South Africa, 2004). This proportion increased to 49% in 2002, highlighting
the casualisation of farm labour over the past decade. Bhorat and Lundall (2004) suggest that
the shift to part-time employment across most sectors in South Africa has been both
significant and rapid.
Previous studies have estimated the demand for farm labour in South African agriculture.
However, no studies have been conducted on a national scale for some time. Latt and
Nieuwoudt (1985) estimated the long-run price elasticity of demand and supply for
agricultural labour in KwaZulu-Natal to be -1,39 and 5,18, respectively. Conradie (2005)
conducted a localised study in the Breerivier Valley of the Western Cape where she
estimated the short-run price elasticity of demand for farm labour as -0,3.
• Latest census of commercial agriculture conducted in 2002.
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This study aims to obtain a reliable estimate of the long-run price elasticity of demand for
regular agricultural labour in South Africa in order to assess the appropriateness of labour
legislation that has increased the cost of farm labour since the early 1990s. Both single
equation (Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)) and simultaneous-equation (Two-stage Least
Squares (2SLS)) demand models are estimated using secondary data obtained for 43 years
(1960-2002) from Statistics South Africa (2004 and 2005) and the Abstract of Agricultural
Statistics (2005). The 2SLS model includes a labour supply equation.
Chapter 1 provides a brief description of the agricultural labour market in South Africa,
followed by Chapter 2 which contextualises recent labour legislation. Chapter 3 deals with
the impact of legislation on agriculture with particular reference to the effects of minimum
wage legislation. The data and techniques used to estimate the single equation and
simultaneous equation demand models are introduced in Chapter 4. The results of these
models are presented and discussed in Chapter 5. The study ends with a presentation of
policy implications and conclusions.
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CHAPTER 1
FARM LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA
This chapter provides a brief background to the farm labour market in SA agriculture,
including agriculture's contribution to GDP, the casualisation of farm labour and information
on the demand for, and the supply of, farm labour in South Africa.
1.1 Background to the farm labour market in South Africa
Primary commercial agriculture contributes less than 4% to the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) of South Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2005). However, there are strong backward
and forward linkages into the economy so that the agro-industrial sector is estimated to
comprise about 15% of GDP. Agricultural products account for more than 30% of the total
job opportunities in the manufacturing sector and represent 25% of manufacturing's
contribution to the GDP (Statistics South Africa, 2005). Bhorat and Hodge (1999) noted that
the previous 25 years of economic development have been marked by a decline in the share
of primary sectors in the GDP. Figure 1.1 shows the trends in employment of regular and
seasonal farm workers since 1960, and emphasises the recent casualisation of the labour
force in SA agriculture. Casual labour refers to labour whose employment is intermittent,
sporadic or extends over short periods. Labour of this kind is normally recruited from the
nearest available source (Department of Labour, 2005). Any person who is employed for 24
hours or more per month enjoys the protection afforded by the BCEA 75 of 1997. This
means that the provisions regarding working hours, overtime and meal intervals would apply.
The employee may even qualify for annual leave, sick leave, family responsibility leave, etc.
(Department of Labour, 2005).
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Regular labour is the most common form of employment. A person is employed on an
indefinite basis and, in some circumstances, is subject to a probationary period that is
reasonable with reference to the nature of the job (normally not more than six months)
(Department of Labour, 2005). According to the LRA 66 of 1995, the employee enjoys
similar protection to any other ("permanent") employee regarding security of employment.
In terms of dismissing labour, different procedures have to be followed, depending on
whether the intended termination is due to misconduct, poor work performance, medical
incapacity or operational requirements. These procedures are rather cumbersome and the
employer's failure to follow them could result in a claim for reinstatement or compensation






















FIGURE 1.1: Trends in employment of regular and casual farm labour in South Africa,
1960 - 2002 (Statistics South Africa, 2005)
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1.2 Demand for labour in South Africa
The law of demand suggests that quantity demanded of a product will decrease when the
product's (in this case labour's) own price rises, ceteris paribus. A change in demand is
caused by a change in the demand shifters or ceteris paribus conditions, such as prices of
substitutes (e.g., machinery and labour contracting) (Parkin, 1996; Petersen and Lewis,
1999). The demand for a factor of production, such as labour or capital, may be considered
as being derived from the demand for the final product. It is therefore a function of the price
of the final product, the price of the input in question, the prices of all other inputs and the
level of technology (Friedman, 1962). The slope of the derived demand curve is determined
by two factors: its share of the producer's budget and the availability of substitutes and
complements (McConnell and Brue, 1999:47). Goedecke and Ortmann (1993) suggest that
as the relative cost of labour increases it is substituted with machinery (capital) and
machinery and labour contractors. Friedman (1962) contends that demand analysis is further
complicated by simultaneous reactions of all firms to resource price changes. Individual
value of marginal product (VMP) curves will change in such a way as to make the industry
(agricultural) labour demand curve less elastic than the sum of the individual demand curves.
This study attempts to estimate the industry demand function for labour. Lewis et at. (1996)
found that prior to the implementation of minimum wages in the SA agricultural sector in
2003, employment was already declining due to new labour legislation and consequential
increases in transaction costs and risk carried by farmers.
There are very few documented empirical estimates of the price elasticity of demand for
agricultural labour in South Africa. Latt and Nieuwoudt (1985) estimate the price elasticity
of demand for labour in KwaZulu-Natal as -1,39 over the period 1972-1978. Conradie
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(2005) suggests that the price elasticity of demand for farm labour in the Breerivier Valley of
the Western Cape is -0,3. Mazumdar and van Seventer (2002) estimated the price elasticity
of demand for unskilled labour in the manufacturing sector as -0,9 for the 1980s and -1,15 for
the 1990s. Also in the manufacturing sector, Behar (2004) estimated the price elasticity of
demand for unskilled and semi-skilled workers as -0,65 and -0,8 respectively. Lianos (1972)
estimated the price elasticity of demand for hired farm labour in the United States (US) as -
1,37, while Gardner (1972) also estimated the price elasticity of demand for hired farm
labour in the US as -1,4.
1.3 Supply of labour in South Africa
Approximately 41% of the SA population live in rural areas (Statistics South Africa, 2005).
Many unskilled rural workers commute and migrate to jobs in non-farm sectors, such as
mining, which generally offer higher wages, thus decreasing the supply of regular labour to
the agricultural sector. De Wet and Van Heerden (2003) argue that because unemployment
seems to be a phenomenon that is so prevalent among the unskilled labour force, it seems
plausible to assume that the supply of unskilled and informal sector labour in South Africa is
highly elastic, and could verge on perfect elasticity.
A major constraint to faster GDP growth and thus greater labour absorption in South Africa
is the shortage of skilled labour (De Wet and Van Heerden, 2003) . The SA government has
recognised the critical need to improve the quality of school education, particularly in maths
and science, and is prioritising technical and quantitative skills (Paton and Singh, 2005, cited
by Ortmann, 2005) . Hertz (2002: 12) notes that SA policy recommends that "absolute
priority" be given to introducing ten years of free and compulsory general education, and to
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ensuring that this new compulsory education be of high quality, especially in "disadvantaged
townships, farms, villages, informal settlements and rural areas." Transforming this right
into practical reality, however, is difficult.
The supply of highly skilled and semi-skilled labour tends to be price inelastic. There seems
to be very little (if any) unemployment in these two groups in South Africa, and wages tend
to adjust as the demand for this type of labour increases or decreases (De Wet and Van
Heerden, 2003). Bhorat and Hodge (1999) suggest that increases in the capital intensity of
production would lower the demand for unskilled and low-skilled labour that is being
replaced by new capital equipment, but increase the demand for more skilled labour that are
required to operate and maintain the new capital equipment.
HN/ AIDS is a fatal disease of the immune system transmitted through blood products
especially by sexual contact or contaminated needles. The disease impacts directly on human
resources and indirectly on the operations of commercial agriculture (Topouzis, 1998).
Agricultural productivity, labour turnover rates, and production costs on commercial farms
. are adversely affected by the premature death and ill-health of workers infected by the
disease. Ortmann (2005) suggests that employers have to invest more time in recruiting and
training replacement workers at considerable expense to their businesses. Infected workers
are too weak to perform farming tasks and those workers with skills become less productive
and eventually die, crippling the supply of labour to SA agriculture.
There are very few published estimates of the supply elasticities for farm labour in South
Africa. Latt and Nieuwoudt (1985) estimated the price elasticity of farm labour supply in
KwaZulu-Natal as 5,18, while Behar (2005) estimated the price elasticity of supply for
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unskilled labour in South Africa as 4,1. Internationally, a study conducted by the National
Food and Agricultural Policy Project (NFAPP, 2003) estimates the price elasticity of supply
for farm workers in California as 0,75. Domeij and Floden (2002) state that if the
econometrician ignores borrowing constraints, the price elasticity of labour supply will be
biased downwards. The study, conducted in Sweden, estimated labour supply elasticity to be
0,55. Salhofer (2000) estimates the price elasticities of labour supply for farm labour in
Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom as 0,16, 0,28 and 0,5 respectively. The price
elasticity of supply for farm labour is expected to be much higher in South Africa where




LABOUR LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
The chapter begins with a study of the labour legislation introduced in SA agriculture in the
early 1990s, labour legislation introduced from the mid-1990s, as well as problems
associated with the legislation.
2.1 Labour legislation affecting agriculture in the early 1990s
In the past, labour in SA agriculture had very little protection in the way of legislation. The
main form of protection was through common law which was based on legal precedents set
on past judgments (Newman, 1996). Common law always allowed for a service contract
between employer (farmer) and employee (farm worker). According to Newman (1996) and
Lewis et al. (1996), farmers started adjusting to labour legislation introduced in the early
1990s before the country's first democratic elections in 1994. The following legislation
affected agriculture prior to 1994:
(1) The Basic Conditions ofEmployment Act (BCEA) 104 of 1992
(2) The Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act (UIA) 130 of 1992
(3) The Agricultural Labour Act (ALA) 147 of 1993.
(4) Occupational Health and Safety Act 85 of 1993.
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2.2 An overview of labour legislation introduced post-1994
Agricultural labour legislation was introduced because common law was inadequate in
regulating the relationship between labourer and farmer (de lager and Wild 1993, cited by
Newman 1996: 12). The following legislation affected agriculture after 1994:
(1) The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (amended)
(2) The Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of2001 (amended)
(3) Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
(4) The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996
(5) The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997
(6) Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998
(7) Skills Development Levies Act 9 of 1999
- (8) The Sectoral Determination (an amendment of the BCEA 75 of 1997) which includes
the imposition of minimum wages.
2.2.1 The Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (amended)
"The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 75 of 1997 was introduced to advance
economic development and social justice by fulfilling the primary objectives of this Act,
which are-
(a) to give effect to and regulate the right to fair labour practices conferred by section 23
(1) of the Constitution, namely (i) by establishing and enforcing basic conditions of
employment; and (ii) by regulating the variation of basic conditions of employment;
and
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(b) to give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member of the International
Labour Organisation" (Department of Labour, 2003).
The BCEA stipulates the maximum number of hours worked weekly, the daily ordinary
working hours and the maximum number of hours an employee may work in a 24 hour
period. The Act also provides for the extension of working hours, meal intervals and
overtime. In a study conducted by the Department of Labour (2001) it was shown that many
farmers did not comply with the conditions of employment, particularly in respect of working
hours. In terms of the minimum wage legislation, a worker should work a minimum of 27
and a maximum of 45 hours a week to qualify for the minimum wage. However, the
minimum of 27 hours per week now only applies to domestic workers and not all farm
workers who will receive the full monthly wage in their specific regions (Department of
Labour, 2006). In the Department of Labour (2001) study, half of the workers interviewed
indicated that there are times in the year in which they work 55 hours or more a week. One
in ten said that they sometimes work for more than 72 hours a week. The Act stipulates the
payment for overtime and work on Sundays and Public holidays. The Act deals with annual
leave, sick leave and termination of service contracts. In the study conducted by the
Department of Labour (2001), many respondents did not receive their legal entitlements in
terms of annual leave, sick leave, maternity leave, UIF membership and overtime pay.
Children of 14 years and younger were reported to be working on nearly a quarter of the
farms in the study (15 years being the minimum). Children of 15 to 17 years were reported
to be working on nearly 40% of the surveyed farms.
The BCEA also requires that farmers display the Act where employees can read it in their
own language in order to understand their rights and obligations. The remuneration process
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that must be followed by the employer is described, including the keeping of records, and
deductions and payment of contributions to benefit funds. The Act stipulates the role of
labour inspectors and their responsibilities. If a farmer is found guilty of contravening the
Act he/she can be fined, imprisoned or both.
Barker (2003) states that the Act increases direct and indirect costs of labour. Transaction
costs, in terms of time, money and effort spent by farmers dealing with labour are increased.
The reduction of hours worked increases the cost of labour and production costs in general
owing to fixed labour costs, variable labour costs and capital costs. Since fixed labour costs
and capital costs do not change in proportion to the decrease in the number of hours worked,
the cost of employment is spread over fewer hours , thus increasing the hourly cost of labour.
With regards to variable costs of labour, if the labour is paid hourly then the cost of labour
per hour remains constant. But if the labourers are paid weekly or monthly and the wage rate
remains constant with a decrease in the number of hours worked, the reduction in hours
worked will increase the hourly cost of labour. As the cost of labour increases, so farmers
will tend to substitute capital for labour (Barker 2003).
2.2.2 The Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 (amended)
The purpose of the Unemployment Insurance Act (UIA) is to establish an unemployment
insurance fund to which employers and employees contribute and from which employees
who become unemployed or their beneficiaries are entitled to benefit. The Act is therefore
intended to alleviate the harmful economic and social effects of unemployment (Department
of Labour, 2003). Goedeke (1993: 17) suggests that the fund ensures that contributors will be
insured against the loss of wages following dismissal, illness or pregnancy. The Act applies
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to all employers and employees, other than employees employed for less than 24 hours a
month with a particular employer (Department of Labour, 2003).




• adoption benefits (e.g., only one contributor of the child adopting parties is entitled to
the adoption benefits in respect of each adopted child).
The Act also makes allowance for the role of labour inspectors and includes a list of offences
in terms of the Act; for example, failure of an employer to contribute to the Unemployment
Insurance Fund.
2.2.3 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA)
The Agricultural Labour Act 147 of 1993 (ALA) allowed for the creation of an agricultural
labour court. The court dealt mainly with unfair labour practices. The Act set out procedures
for dismissal of a labourer and dealt with labour unionisation. In 1995, the LRA was adopted
and the ALA was amended. The LRA gives employees the right to freedom of association,
i.e., to join any trade union. It also allows employees to organise and collectively bargain
with regards to trade unions. The Act allows for trade union members to take time off work
to attend meetings Of strikes, as trade unions that are registered now have the right to strike
and also have organisational rights. The LRA provides the procedures that must be followed
when taking a dispute to the Council for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) or
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the Labour Court. Unfair labour practices and unfair dismissals are dealt with in the LRA.
Finally, the LRA provides a guideline or a 'Code of Good Practice' for employers to follow
when dealing with labour issues (Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995).
2.2.4 The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996
The Act is based on the principle that the existing system of labour tenancy was the result of
racially discriminatory laws and practices that denied tenants access to land. It gives labour
tenants and their families the right to acquire land and security of tenure in their places of
residence. Beneficiaries can access a range of grants (R20 000 to RlOO 000) depending on
the amount of their own contribution in kind, labour and/or cash. Beneficiaries must provide
an own contribution of at least R5 000 (Department of Land Affairs, 2006). The Act was
passed in March 1996 but was retroactive since June 1995 (Land Reform Act 3 of 1996).
The Act makes a distinction between labour tenants and farm workers. Labour tenants work
for the owner or lessee of a farm, and are paid in terms of land use (grazing, cultivation, etc.)
and housing use. Unlike farm workers they do not receive a cash wage. All labour tenants,
who meet the requirements of the definition, are assumed to have legal rights to live on and
use the land on the farm on which they currently stay. It is also assumed that, in return for
these rights, the labour tenants, or a member of the labour tenant's family, will continue to
provide labour to the farm owner as has been the case in the past (Land Reform Act 3 of
1996).
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2.2.5 The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA)
Many South Africans do not have secure tenure of their homes and the land which they use
and are therefore vulnerable to unfair eviction leading to great hardship, conflict and
instability. It is suggested that this situation is in part the result of past discriminatory laws
and practices conducted during the apartheid era (Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of
1997). According to the Department of Labour (2001), the Act provides for measures to
facilitate long-term security of land tenure where possible through the joint efforts of
occupiers, landowners and government bodies. The Act further regulates the conditions of
residence on certain land, as well as the conditions on and circumstances under which the
right of persons to reside on land may be terminated. ESTA regulates the conditions and
circumstances under which persons, whose right of residence has been terminated, may be
evicted from land. The law regulates the eviction of vulnerable occupiers from land in a fair
manner, while recognising the right of land owners to apply to court for an eviction order in
appropriate circumstances to ensure that occupiers are not further prejudiced (Extension of
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997).
2.2.6 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA)
The EEA obliges employers to reduce 'disproportionate' income differentials. There is
substantial income inequality between economic sectors; the lowest paid sector is by far the
agricultural sector. The EEA was created to try and decrease the inequality within the SA
agricultural sector as well as between sectors. Discrimination is illegal according to section 6
of the Act. It states that no employer may discriminate against employees, "on one or more
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic
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or social origin , colour, sexual orientation , age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience,
belief, political opinion, culture, language and birth." The Act also deals with Affirmative
Action measures and procedures that employers must follow. Affirmative Action makes sure
that qualified designated groups (black people, women and people with disabilities) have
equal opportunities to acquire a job (Employment Equity Act 55 ofI998).
2.2.7 Skills Development Levies Act 9 of 1999 (SDLA)
The purposes of the SDLA are to develop the skills of the SA workforce by:
• improving the quality of life of workers , their prospects ofwork and labour mobility;
• improving productivity in the workplace and the competitiveness of employers;
• promote self-employment; and
• improve the delivery of social services
The Act further aims to increase the levels of investment in education and training in the
labour market and to improve the return on that investment (Skills Development Levies Act 9
of 1999). The Act encourages employers to:
• use the workplace as an active learning environment;
• provide employees with the opportunities to acquire new skills;
• provide opportunities for new entrants to the labour market to gain work experience;
and
• employ persons who find it difficult to be employed
Furthermore, the SDLA aims to assist work-seekers to find work, retrenched workers to re-
enter the labour market, employers to find qualified employees, and to provide and regulate
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employment services (Skills Development Levies Act 9 of 1999). These purposes are
achieved by:
(a) establishing an institutional and financial framework comprising:
• the National Skills Authority;
• the National Skills Fund;
• a skills development levy-grant scheme as contemplated in the Skills Development
. Levies Act;
• SETAs (Sector Education and Training Authorities);
• labour centres; and
• the Skills Development Planning Unit
(b) encouraging partnerships between the public and private sectors of the economy to
provide education and training in and for the workplace.
2.2.8 The Sectoral Determination (published by the BCEA)
In terms of the Sectoral Determination, which is included in the Basic Conditions of
Employment Act 75 of 1997, farmers were required to pay the prescribed minimum wages of
R650 and R800 per month in defined areas (B and A respectively) from March 2003. In
addition, the Act sets conditions of employment for farm workers.
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2.2.8.1 Wage rate
Originally in 2001, the minimum monthly wage level proposed ranged between R400 in the
poorer areas to R700 in the wealthier regions ofthe country (Barker, 2003). The wages were
prescribed for two areas, namely Area A (cities and major towns) and Area B (the rest of
South Africa). Municipal boundaries were used to distinguish between the two areas
(Department of Labour, 2003). On J March 2003 the minimum wage legislation came into
effect and by law farmers had to pay their employees a minimum monthly wage of R800 in
Area A and R650 in Area B. These wages were only applicable to those who worked for
more than 27 hours per week. The Act permits a maximum of 45 hours of work per week.
This comprises nine hours on any day if the worker works for five days or less in a week; or
eight hours in any day if the farm worker works for more than five days in any week. The
Act allows for 15 hours of overtime per week. Those who work less than 27 hours per week
would receive a minimum of R4.1O per hour in Area A and R3.33 in area B. These
minimum wage levels increased on 1 March 2004 to R880 in Area A and R715 in area B
(Department of Labour, 2003). As from the I March 2005 the wages increased to R950 per
month in Area A and R786 per month in Area B or an hourly rate of R4.87 and R4.03
respectively. The wage rate increased again on 1 March 2006 to R994 per month in Area A
and R885 per month in Area B or an hourly rate of R5.1O and R4.54 respectively. The
minimum of 27 hours per week now only applies to domestic workers and not all farm
workers, who will receive the full monthly wage in their specific regions (Department of
Labour, 2006). The Act prohibits the employment of children under the age of 15 years and
defines four types of leave which the farm worker is entitled to; namely, annual leave, sick
leave, family responsibility leave and maternity leave (Department of Labour, 2005).
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2.2.8.2 Deductions
The Sectoral Determination Act stipulates that a farmer may only deduct money from wages
if the farm worker agrees. These deductions may include: savings, provident and related
funds, repayment of a loan .to a financial institution and trade union subscriptions. The
farmer may not deduct for tools and equipment provided at the workplace, uniforms, meals
taken during working hours, or any accidental damages (Department of Labour, 2005).
·2.2.8.3 Payments in kind
Newman (1996) notes that labour in commercial agriculture normally receive a cash wage
and payments in kind from the farmer. Employers may reduce or even eliminate perquisites
if they are not considered part of the minimum wage. Newman (1996) found that most
farmers would pay labourers a cash wage and charge for perquisites if the minimum wages
exceed their current payments. Payments in kind generally comprise a combination of food
rations, grazing rights, cultivation rights and accommodation on the farm. The Department
of Labour (2005) suggests that payments in kind must be valued on the basis of the cost to
the employer of supplying goods and services to workers subject to these restrictions:
a. The total payment in kind may not be deemed to constitute more than 20% of the total
wage.
b. No additional deduction may be made from the worker's cash wage for a payment in
kind.
c. Housing may be considered to constitute payment in kind only if no rental is charged
for the house in which the worker is resident.
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d. A deduction, not exceeding one-tenth of the wage due to the farm worker on the pay-
day concerned, towards the repayment of any amount loaned or advanced to the farm
worker by the farmer.
According to the Minister Mdladlana, "We recognised that farm workers more often than not
are dependent on the provision of rations as a result of the relative isolation of farms and
farm workers. To this extent, we have allowed a deduction of 10% from wages for food and a
further 10% where accommodation is provided if it meets certain requirements" (Department
of Labour, 2003:17). A national survey published by the Department of Labour (2003)
shows that 83% of farm workers lived on farms and that four out of five paid rent. In three
out of four cases, the owner pays for the maintenance of the worker cottages. Some of the
services, like housing, are free of charge while others, like medical costs, carry a 50%
employer subsidy. The survey shows that employers are beginning to reduce handouts and
make workers pay for services (Department of Labour, 2003).
2.2.9 Problems with the labour legislation
The introduction of labour legislation to agriculture is a contentious issue among farmers
when it increases costs. The BCEA and VIA increase the time, money and effort spent by
farmers dealing with labour (i.e., transaction costs), while the Labour Relations Act increases
the risk of industrial action on farms. The Skills Development Levies Act results in further
costs for the farmer in terms of providing training and education for the workers. Moreover,
the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act and Extension of Security of Tenure Act expose
farmers with more on-farm labour to greater risk of land claims. According to Vink and
Tregurtha (2003) and Goedeke and Ortmann (1993), the increase in labour costs (including
transaction costs and risk) has led to the substitution of own machinery, contract machinery
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or contract labour for own labour. However, Hertz (2002) contends that disemployment
caused by higher wages could aggravate poverty even if demand for labour is not price
elastic. The enforceability of the law is also problematic as there are few inspectors and it is
hardly likely that all farmers will be visited to see if they comply with the law. Newman
(1996) suggested that incentives could be introduced to ensure that farmers comply with the
law. Currently, the Land Bank has introduced various incentives such as discounted loans,
easier access to loans and equity finance for farmers who do comply with the law
(Department of Labour, 2005).
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CHAPTER 3
IMPACT OF LABOUR LEGISLATION ON SA AGRICULTURE
The minimum wage was originally proposed as part of a broad labour market policy aimed at
increasing labour productivity and achieving stability throughout the country. However,
minimum wages are progressive in that the lowest paid workers receive the largest income
increases but, at the same time, there are a large number of job losses which create losses in
income that may force many households into poverty (Hertz, 2002). This chapter presents
the implications of labour legislation for SA agriculture, with particular reference to the
likely impacts ofminimum wages.
3.1 Agricultural employment in South Africa
The effect of minimum wages in agriculture has to be viewed against the background of
substantial labour shedding across the country in the last 30 years. Payne et al. (1990) report
an annual decline of 1.15% between 1970 and 1990. One in five workers lost their jobs
between 1990 and 1992 (Department of Labour, 2005). Between 1993 and 2002, when the
last agricultural census was conducted, agricultural employment in South Africa fell by
13,9% (from 1 093 265 to 940 815 workers) (Statistics South Africa, 2005). A loss of
employment in agriculture due to increases in labour costs (and accompanied by depressed
agricultural economic conditions) is an important push factor driving the least skilled labour
out of the agricultural sector (Nieuwoudt and Groenewald, 2003). Farm workers will move
to urban areas to seek employment because jobs are unavailable in rural areas.
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In comparison with other countries, South Africa has one of the highest levels of
unemployment in the world. In 1994, according to comparative estimates made by the
International Labour Organisation (ILO), only Reunion (33%) and Macedonia (31%) had
rates of unemployment as high as or higher than South Africa (Vink and Tregurtha 2003).
Hertz (2002) suggests that unofficial estimates of unemployment were as high as 47% in
some rural areas. In 2005, the official unemployment rate in South Africa was 26,5%, while
unofficial unemployment estimates were around 41% (Statistics South Africa, 2005).
Figure 3.1 shows employment trends in SA agriculture from 1980 to 2002. The graph also
shows the real average cash wage (including cash salaries and bonuses) per month
throughout the period as well as total remuneration. The base year for real wages is 2000.
Total employment is divided into regular (or permanent) employment and casual
employment. It is evident from the graph that the real wage rate increased and employment
fell over time, particularly since 1990. The graph shows the real average wage rate declined
from 1996 to 2002. From Appendix 1 it is evident that this decline is due to a decrease in
the real wage for casual labour and an increase in the proportion of casual labour in total
farm labour.
Figure 3.1 shows total employment amounting to approximately 1.15 million in 1980
compared to 0,94 million in 2002. This is a decrease of 18,3% in agricultural labour
employment over a 22-year period. This has, in part , been caused by deregulation of
agricultural product markets, subsidies being slashed and import tariffs all but eliminated
(Hertz, 2002). From the early 1990s, when labour legislation first impacted on agriculture,
farmers would have reacted to the legislation due to a perceived increase in labour costs,
resulting in a decrease in total labour employment. The average total wage in 2002 was just
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over R600 per month throughout the country. In March 2003 this wage increased to an
average of R725 (R593,77*) (R800 in Area A and R650 in Area B), due mainly to the
*imposition of minimum wages. The average increased again to R797,50 (R644,1O) in
March 2004 and R868 (R678,1O*) in March 2005. As at 1 March 2006, the average wage
was set at R940 (R714,20*) (R994 in Area A and R885 in Area B) (Department of Labour,
2006). An Agricultural Census was conducted throughout the country in 1996 and then
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FIGURE 3.1: Employment and real average wages in South African agriculture, 1980-
2002 (Statistics South Africa, 2005)
* Wage rate expressed in real terms (base year = 2000)
** The monthly cash wage includes the cash wage payable to the labourer on a monthly basis
*** Total monthly remuneration includes cash wages plus payment in kind, benefits , bonuses, etc.
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Conradie (2003) states that only half of South Africa's potential labour force is able to find
employment in the formal economy. Men in full-time permanent positions are the most
important and clearly defined labour category. All farmers employ them, and many think of
their permanently employed (regular) men as their "real" workforce (Conradie, 2003:10).
Many women work on farms alongside their partners, yet never share the benefits of full-
time employment such as UIF, provident funds, etc. (Department of Labour, 2001).
According to Stoltz (2003, cited by Conradie, 2003:7), farmers say that they "make work" to
keep women busy so as to secure them for the critical harvest season but also to raise
household income. Women who already work short hours are probably more vulnerable to
legislated wage increases than those working full-time year round. The Department of
Labour (2001) reports that women, the less skilled and those who live in the rural areas are
more likely to be poor and less likely to find formal sector employment. In this regard, the
agricultural labour force sits at the junction between the formal and informal economies.
Farm workers earn more than those engaged in informal activities in urban and non-urban
areas, yet they earn less than other workers in the formal economy.
One of the major constraints to faster GDP growth and thus greater labour absorption in SA
. is the shortage of skills. Importantly, government has recognised the critical need to improve
the quality of school education, particularly in maths and science, and is prioritising technical
and quantitative skills. Gallasch and Gardner (1978) stated that a higher level of schooling
and/or an increase in a minimum wage .would i~crease the average wage and decrease
employment on farms due to a decreased supply of farm labour. Currently in South Africa,
the availability of schooling to the average rural child is better today then it was 30 years ago.
This suggests that the average level of education and skills is higher among rural teenagers
and young adults than the older generation, forcing an increase in the wage and a decrease in
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employment. In the agricultural sector, in the period 1996 to 2002, the proportion of skilled
labour (10%) remained the same, while the percentage of semi-skilled labour increased (from
22% to 47%) and unskilled labour decreased (from 68% to 43%) because retrenchments are
selective (Statistics South Africa, 2004). Ortmann (2005) argues that the demand for
appropriate skills will increase as the economy grows, and it may be necessary to import
appropriate skills in the short to medium term in order to augment existing skills.
Government, however, would have to liberalise its immigration policies. While general
economic growth in the non-farm sector increases the farm wage rate and reduces farm
employment, better skilled workers who leave the farm sector in response to the pull of this
"invisible hand" are more likely to find satisfactory employment than are less skilled workers
displaced from agriculture by the "invisible foot" of the minimum wage (Gallasch and
Gardner, 1978:267).
The farming sector has been subjected to extensive market deregulation over the past decade
and a major reform of labour legislation. There is a clear bias toward capital using
technology in SA agriculture (Department of Labour, 2001).
. 3.2 Minimum wage
Lianos (1972) states that a decline in employment is to be expected with the imposition of a
minimum wage. This is the result of two negative effects: a direct effect as employers tend
to substitute non-labour inputs for labour, which becomes relatively expensive, and an
indirect effect through substitution in consumption as the good produced by the labour
receiving the minimum wage becomes relatively expensive.
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Competitive labour market models suggest a negative relationship between employment and
wages. If a statutory minimum wage causes large wage increases, significant unemployment
might result if the unit cost of labour rises (Conradie, 2003). Gallasch and Gardner (1978)
report on a study by Gardner which estimated that a minimum wage increase of 13% above
the average wage would decrease employment by 18% in the long-run, while a study by
Gallasch (reported by Gallasch and Gardner, 1978) found that a minimum wage which
increased the average wage by 3% would reduce employment by 15% in the long-run.
The Department of Labour (2001) reports that the primary goal of a minimum wage should
be to address income inequalities within the agricultural sector. To this end, the minimum
wage has to be accompanied by enforcement of basic conditions of employment, including
UIF and other measures, to protect the interest of women, who consistently earn less than
men, and who are less likely to be employed as permanent workers. Barker (2003) suggests
that a minimum wage is used to help those workers in the labour force who do not have their
conditions of employment determined by a fair collective bargaining process and, in addition
to this, may help those employees with low personal leverage to have more security in their
employment contract.
The standard model of a unified and perfectly competitive labour market predicts that setting
minimum wages above the market equilibrium will reduce employment and the elasticity of
this response depends on the level at which the minimum is set, the low-wage labour share,
and the elasticity of substitution between low-wage labour and other inputs (Hertz, 2002).
Reduced employment will occur in sectors where a minimum wage is set higher than the
equilibrium wage rate. However, when the minimum wage is set below the average wage
rate in the industry, a minimum wage could compress the wide range of wage rates found in a
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sector (Vink and Tregurtha, 2003). Conradie (2003) states that prior to minimum wage
implementation, South Africa experienced a wide range of wages throughout various regions
of the country; for example, in 2002 grape farmers in the Western Cape paid higher wages
than any other region of the country. Hertz (2002) states that the effects of a minimum wage
will vary according to income and will only be of any crucial economic significance
depending on the stringency of enforcement and the changes of employment brought about
by the minimum wage.
Figure 3.2 shows the traditional effects of a minimum wage in a market for unskilled labour.
Assuming the market is allowed to work freely, then Lo unskilled workers are employed at a
wage of Wo. A fixed factor of production, say, entrepreneurship, earns a surplus denoted by
areas A, C, and E. Workers earn rent in the amount denoted by areas B, D, and F. Notably,
workers who hold these jobs are those who earn the most rent (Ippolito, 2003). Those
unskilled workers on the bottom portion of the supply are high-rent workers and those further
up, low-rent workers. If the government enacts a minimum wage of W 1, then Lo - Lz
unskilled workers would be unemployed. The Lz workers still employed earn more rent,
denoted by area C. Areas A + B measure the deadweight cost imposed by the .wage













FIGURE 3.2: Effects of a minimum wage (Ippolito, 2003)
In the second-round effect, more workers enter the market at the regulated wage. There is an
excess supply for the now-scarce jobs for low-skilled workers: L3 workers are now searching
for L2 jobs. The workers all look alike from the perspective of firms hiring from the
applicant pool. The additional social cost of the minimum wage comes about because
employers prefer to hire low-rent workers instead of high-rent workers. The cost can be high
in relation to the loss described in the first round (Ippolito, 2003).
Burton et al. (1970) state that under conditions of a perfectly competitive labour market, an
effective minimum wage will have the following outcomes: the size of the workforce will be
reduced as the value of the worker's services is lower than the minimum wage and the
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productivity of those workers remaining is increased. The lower the value of their services is
below the minimum wage, the more elastic is the demand for output the workers produce,
and the higher the available substitution possibilities are for the workforce services.
Vink and Tregurtha (2003) state that the aim of a minimum wage should be clearly set out
and from an economic point of view, it may be better to provide direct income transfers to
the poor rather than to manipulate market prices (wages) or price supports as a mechanism of
farm subsidies. Politicians, however, have preferred the latter. The Department of Labour
(2001) argue that their research has shown that economists have traditionally favoured lump-
sum transfers as the most efficient form of subsidisation. However, the minimum wage is
expedient as the mechanisms for its implementation are already in place (Department of
Labour, 2003).
Hertz (2002) states that the most important issue around the minimum wage is whether a
single wage can be set for the whole of the agricultural sector. Lianos (1972) suggests that
the overall effect on the agricultural sector is a decrease in employment, especially of
unskilled, females and younger workers, if the minimum wage is set too high. Although a
single minimum wage may be easier to implement and place less of a burden on
implementation structures, it would have to be set so low in order to accommodate the
interests of workers in the extensive livestock sector as to be meaningless; or alternatively so
high to accommodate the needs of workers on fruit and wine farms, that the rest of the sector
will not be able to pay such wages (Hertz, 2002). The Sectoral Determination (see section
2.2.8) also deals with the demarcation of the agricultural sector in South Africa into A and B
districts which define the level of minimum wages.
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3.2.1 Macroeconomic and microeconomic considerations of minimum wages
The Department of Labour (2001) found that although the agricultural wage rate in South
Africa grew at a faster rate than in many other sectors of the economy, the gap between the
wage rate in agriculture and the rest of the formal economy continues to increase. The
agricultural wage is important for rural households as it constitutes, on average, 39% of rural
incomes (Department of labour, 2001). A net decrease in employment may also lead to an
increase in total employment if the upstream and downstream employment effects of the
increased spending by those whose wages increase is larger than the direct and indirect
disemployment of the decreased spending by those rendered unemployed by the minimum
wage (Vink and Tregurtha, 2003).
On a microeconomic scale, a 1979 survey of economists working at universities, III
government and in the business sector in the United States (Kearl et al., 1979:34) showed
that 90% of them generally agreed that "A minimum wage increases unemployment among
young and unskilled workers." This statement can be supplemented by arguments that also
include the losses that occur when the high productivity firms cannot hire the lowest-wage
workers and when firms with a high ability to evade minimum wages displace firms with a
low ability, even though the latter may be more productive. In the case of perfect
competition, however, some poor people gain higher wages, but losses are borne by those
who become unemployed and by employers. Further, those who lose jobs will seek
employment in sectors where there are no minimum wages. This will depress wages in those
industries as well (Lang and Khan, 1998).
Nevertheless, there have always been differing views concentrating on issues such as:
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• The effects of different relative capital/labour ratios. For example, if the sector
covered by the minimum wage were more capital intensive than the rest of the
economy, and the demand for its goods fairly elastic, a minimum wage would cause
its labour employment to fall. Both capital and labour would move to relatively less
capital-intensive parts of the economy. The added capital would make these sectors
more capital intensive and thus wage rates would be higher (Johnson, 1990, cited by
Vink and Tregurtha, 2003).
• The long-term positive growth effects occasioned by improved human capital.
Vink and Tregurtha (2003) suggest that this model is very close to human capital
theory. It states that, in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth,
high minimum wages can have positive effects on growth rate and welfare by
increasing the proportion of skilled workers .
3.2.2 Minimum wages abroad
Krueger (1994:12) finds evidence of increased managerial efficiency and higher levels of
worker effort with higher minimum wages in Puerto Rico, and no significant disemployment.
However, he finds that this "induced technological innovation" argument cuts both ways:
management may also discover new labour-saving ways of maintaining output in response to
higher wages.
India is one of the few countries with a long experience in the implementation of minimum
wages. There seems to be a consensus that the minimum wage is one of the instruments
required to alleviate poverty among farm workers (together with land reform, unionization
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and other social security measures), largely because there is a close correlation between the
caste system and farm labourers (Thangaraj, 1995).
There was a period during the early 1990s in the United Kingdom (UK) when only the
agricultural sector was covered by a minimum wage (Vink and Tregurtha, 2003). However,
a later study showed that the average earnings of farm workers were consistently higher than
the minimum wage. Econometric tests show that the level of the minimum wage is "caused"
by the average wage (Vink and Tregurtha, 2003:54). Thus, the Agricultural Wages Boards in
the UK have been reactive and minimum wages have had no impact on average earnings
(Tiffin and Dawson, 1996, cited by Vink and Tregurtha, 2003), but may have had a positive
effect on total employment (Dickens et al., 1995, cited by Vink and Tregurtha, 2003).
Perloff (1986, cited by Hertz, 2002) shows that in the USA, wages in agriculture rise
significantly with the number of hours worked per week. Kabede and Gan (1999) evaluate
the potential of vegetable production to enhance the declining farm income of limited
resource farmers in the USA. As vegetable production is labour intensive and sensitive to
changes in labour costs, an increase in the minimum wage might adversely affect the return
from vegetable production for these vulnerable farmers.
3.3 Machinery contracting and technology
The demand for labour in South Africa is expected to be price elastic due to the availability
of various substitutes, such as machinery or labour contracting (Goedecke and Ortmann,
1993). As the relative cost oflabour increases it is substituted with machinery (capital). This
will occur until the price ratio of labour and capital is equal to the ratio of the marginal
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product of labour to the marginal product of capital. Bhorat and Hodge (1999) suggest that
the process of long-run economic growth is driven by either increasing the stock of factor
inputs (investment to increase capital or population growth to increase labour) or by
improving the productivity of these factor inputs through technological change. These forces
will influence the level of labour demand, but they will only influence the structure of
demand if they favour one set of skills over another. According to the World Bank (1994),
the negative real interest rates for agricultural loans available from the Land Bank and co-
operatives largely explained over-investment in mechanisation in the 1970s and 1980s in
South Africa.
As the price of unskilled labour increases, unskilled labour is replaced with more skilled
(productive) labour, which becomes relatively cheaper (Newman, 1996). Bhorat and Hodge
(1999) stated that increases in capital intensity is expected to lower the demand for unskilled
and low-skilled labour that is being replaced by the new capital equipment, but increase the
demand for more skilled labour who are required to operate and maintain the new capital
equipment. Transaction costs would also increase as more time is spent maintaining labour
records and arbitrating wage disputes with permanent labour. Newman (1996) states that
high transaction costs lead farmers to change their factor mix, for example, by substituting
labour with machinery, contractors or other inputs (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3 shows that as labour costs increase with new labour regulations, the farm will
reduce the employment of labour. El was the initial equilibrium; the new equilibrium is E3,
the point of tangency between the isoquant h and the isocost line KL2• It can be shown,
therefore, that the quantity of labour employed drops from OWl to OW3 and production
drops from isoquant 11 to h. Production falls as the farm's purchasing power has been
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reduced and the farmer is, therefore, unable to produce on isoquant 11• An imaginary isocost
line (MM) is introduced which compensates the firm for any change in real purchasing power
(increase in the cost of labour). The change in purchasing power reduces the farm's
production possibility; this imaginary isocost compensates the farmer for this and shows the
factor input combination at the old level of production, but with new relative prices. If the
firm maintains production at the old level then employment will fall from OWl to OW2 and





FIGURE 3.3: The effect of a change in the cost of labour on the new composition of
factor inputs on the farm (Griffiths and Jones, 1980:85)
Lyne and Ortmann (1996) note that fixed costs introduce economies ofsize and make the
choice of production technique dependent upon farm size. For example, machines may
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substitute for labour on larger farms where fixed costs can be spread over greater volumes of
output. Errington and Bennet (1994, cited by Newman 1996:28) maintain that as machines
become larger and more sophisticated they need to cover a greater area to reach and surpass
the break-even point. Newman (1996:40) suggests that machinery contractors may have a
competitive advantage over some farmers, in that they are able to spread their fixed costs
over a greater number of farms. Due to this cost advantage it is expected that use of
machinery contracting will increase on smaller farms where the costs of mechanisation may
result in over-capitalisation (Newman and Ortmann, 1996). The advantage of using a
machinery contractor is that it should be able to save the farmer repair costs, time, labour
training, housing costs and also improve his cash flow (Goedeke, 1993:80).
As new technologies were developed during the 1960s and 1970s, many industries in South
Africa, including agriculture, chose to increase their capital stock by investing in
sophisticated machinery and employing few skilled technicians rather than adopt labour
intensive methods that would require training and managing a large workforce. This trend
resulted in lower unit labour costs and increased productivity. At the same time, it
contributed to the country's soaring unemployment and spreading poverty, which fuelled
resentment and raised the costs to the government of preserving apartheid (Walker, 1992).
Technological change has been a major contributor to the increases in capital-labour ratios.
The labour market consequences of this change have been to increase the demand for highly
skilled workers, combined with large-scale attrition at the bottom-end of the labour market
(Bhorat, 2004). Batz et al. (1999) suggested that farmers who evaluated the new
technologies available and compared them to their traditional alternatives adopted the new
technologies if their characteristics promised a higher utility than the traditional technology.
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In their study, the effects of new technologies on management complexity, risk reduction,
and farmers' relative risk bearing capacities could explain the past process of adoption.
Empirical evidence presented by Binswanger (1980, cited by Lyne and Ortmann, 1996)
suggests that differences in investment behaviour among farmers facing similar technologies
and risks cannot be explained by differences in their attitudes to risk, but rather by
differences in their constraint set.
3.4 Labour contracting and hiring
Labour costs in SA commercial agriculture are increasing, both in terms of higher wages and,
costs of transacting with labour due to labour legislation. Labour contractors are independent
intermediaries who, for a fee, recruit, hire, and supervise seasonal farm workers (Vandeman
et al., 1991). Labour contractor usage is expected to increase as a way of reducing the risk of
labour action. Contractors are more easily replaced than permanent labour from the farmer's
point of view (Newman and Ortmann, 1996). Both labour and machinery contracting are
expected to be used more intensively in crop production as opposed to livestock production
which requires a broader range of skills (Newman and Ortmann, 1996). Vandemanet al.
(1991) argue that the contracting system is advantageous to growers precisely because it
preserves the casual nature of farm work. They further argue that contractors possess an
advantage in recruiting workers for seasonal jobs because they can spread their recruitment
costs over a number of short-term contracts.
In Figure 3.4 the effect of a change in the cost of labour is evident. The vertical axis shows
the ratio of the marginal product of labour to the marginal product of capital, while the ratio
of labour to capital is measured along the horizontal axis. Assume that the initial ratio of
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labour to capital is OZ, then OZVX measures the share of labour relative to capital in the
total expenditure on capital and labour. Therefore, if the cost of labour rises (due to
increased wage and transaction costs) and the ratio oflabour to capital falls to OY, OYUW is
formed. The elasticity of substitution measures how responsive the factor mix is to responses
to changes in the cost of labour. It is an indication of the extent to which one input
substitutes for another, in this case more expensive labour for capital. This provides an





FIGURE 3.4: Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital (Griffiths and Jones,
1980:97)
With the increasing costs and risks of hiring labour, there is an increase in the capital/labour
ratio. Many small farmers cannot spread the fixed costs of capital adequately over their area
of land and thus resort to contract work on their farms, once again reducing the amount of
labour. Polopolus and Emerson (1991, cited by Newman, 1996:29) suggest that labour
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contracting decreases the transaction costs, as the fanner does not have to apply the new
labour legislation because the labour is hired and is not directly employed, thus transferring




RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the research approach to be followed in analysing
labour demand using secondary data on labour employment in South Africa from 1960-2002.
Both single equation and simultaneous equation labour demand models are presented later in
this chapter.
4.1 Data collection
Most of the data collected for SA farm labour were obtained from Statistics South Africa.
The Agricultural Census Reports (published by Statistics South Africa) are an important
source of agricultural data in South Africa. In the past, these Reports were published on an
annual basis. However, this has now changed. The latest Agricultural Census was
conducted in 2002 and prior to that in 1993. There are, however, annual data available up to
1996. Missing observations for quantity and remuneration of farm labour between 1996 and
2002 were estimated with SPSS (version 11.5) using non-linear interpolation. Data obtained
from the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics (2005) and Population Census Reports (published
by Statistics South Africa) were also used in this study. The consumer price index (CPIX)
(Statistics South Africa, 2005) with a base year of 2000 was used to deflate nominal values to
real values for each of the independent price variables considered in the empirical models.
Appendix 1 summarises the data used in this study.
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4.2 Methodology
In this study, both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS)
regression are used to estimate the labour demand model. The variables for the labour supply
model are used as instrumental variables to estimate the labour demand model using 2SLS
regression,
4.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
Regression analysis is the most frequently used method to estimate demand relationships. It
explains changes in one variable, the dependent variable, as a function of changes in other
variables, the independent variables (Studenmund, 2001: 115). Price and quantity of goods
are jointly determined at the intersection of the supply and demand curves. In this study,
where the wage rate represents the price of labour and the number of regular workers
represents the quantity of labour, the demand model is estimated using both OLS and 2SLS
regression. In theory, OLS should not be applied to estimate a single equation embedded in a
system of simultaneous equations as, generally, one or more of the stochastic explanatory
variables may be correlated with the stochastic disturbance term in that equation resulting in
the estimators obtained being inconsistent (Gujarati, 2003:770).
4.2.2 Two-stage Least Squares (2SLS) regression
Two-stage Least Squares regression is a method of extending regression analysis to cover
models which violate the OLS assumption that the disturbance term of the dependent
variable is uncorrelated with the independent variables (Bollen, 1996). An equation in a
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system of simultaneous equations is said to be exactly identified if there is a unique estimate
for each of its parameters. Two-stage Least Squares regression can be applied to exactly
identified equations and to over-identified equations where there may be more than one value
for one or more structural parameters (Gujarati, 2003:740-748). Two-stage Least Squares
replaces the (stochastic) endogenous explanatory variable with an estimated proxy variable
that is a linear combination of all the predetermined variables in the model (that is
uncorrelated with the stochastic disturbance term) and uses this combination as the
explanatory variable in lieu of the original endogenous variable (Gujarati, 2003:762). A
problem associated with the 2SLS method is that the standard errors of the estimates in the
second stage are not necessarily the correct estimates of the true standard errors (Gujarati,
2003:763).
4.2.3 Piecewise linear regression
The theoretical piecewise linear model is specified as follows:
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where: Yt = regular labour demanded
..¥t = wage rate
X* =threshold value of wage rate
D, = 1 if..¥t> X*
= 0 if..¥t<X*
Assuming E(Ut) = 0, then
E(Yt ID, = 0, ..¥t, X*) = a, + Ih..¥t
which gives the mean regular labour up to the target level X*, and when
which gives the expected mean regular labour quantity demanded beyond the target level X*.
Thus,/11 gives the slope of the regression line in segment I, and/11 + /12 gives the slope of the
regression line in segment II of the piecewise linear regression (Gujarati, 2003:317-319). A
log model was not considered appropriate as it imposes a condition of constant elasticity and,
therefore, excludes the possibility of a change in the estimated price elasticity of labour
demand.
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4.2.4 Partial adjustment model
Both OLS and 2SLS models use an autoregressive scheme to account for time lags in
adjustments made by farmers to the size of their regular labour force following a change in
the expected cost of farm labour. In particular, the labour demand equations take Kyock's
approach to distributed lags by including the lagged value of the dependant variable as an
explanatory variable (Gujarati, 2003:665). Given the following expression;
..... (1)
where the desired number of regular farm workers is Y*t and Xr is the wage rate, the partial
adjustment model postulates that:
..... (2)
where ~ is the coefficient of adjustment that equates the actual change with the desired
change (Gujarati, 2003:677). It is expected that ~ will be less than unity owing to rigidities in
the farm labour market that prevent farmers from achieving the desired change in their
regular labour force in the space of one time period (a single year in this study). Some of
these rigidities are the result of labour legislation. For example, the Labour Relations Act
prevents farmers from dismissing workers without first showing that the reason for dismissal
is related to the worker's conduct or capacity, or is based on the operational requirements of
the business. The farmer should consult the relevant trade unions to settle the dispute and
issue the worker with prior warnings before dismissal (Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995).
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Substituting (1) into (2) yields the partial adjustment model:
..... (3)
from which the parameters of the long-run demand function in expression (1) can be
computed once the parameters of the expression (3), the short-run demand function, have
been estimated. The parameters of (3) can be estimated using OLS regression (Gujarati,
2003:678).
4.3 Single equation labour demand model
Equation (4) presents an economic model for estimating the demand for regular labour in SA
agriculture, while section 4.3.1 presents the economic rationale for the specified variables.
REMPLOYt = ~o + ~lRWAGEt + ~2CWAGEt + ~3CONTRACt+ ~4INTt +








= Number of regular farm labourers demanded / annum
= Constant term
= Slope parameters to be estimated
= Real annual wage of regular farm labour








= Real annual price of contractors
= Real annual prime interest rate (proxy for the cost of capital)
= Real annual price of chemicals
= Real annual value of farm output (gross income)
= Piecewise slope dummy variable for real annual regular farm
wages (specified as [RWAGEt - RWAGE*1991]D t , where D, = 1
for 1991-2002 and 0 otherwise)
= Lagged number of regular farm labourers
= Error term
= 1.... .43
4.3.1 Choice of variables and expected coefficient signs in the demand model
(i) Regular farm labour employment (REMPLOYt) and real regular farm labour
remuneration (RWAGEJ
Data concerning the number of regular labourers employed in SA agriculture were obtained
from Agricultural Census Reports and Labour Force Surveys for 43 years (1960-2002). The
data do not differentiate between sexes, but this was thought to be of little consequence
because much of the work undertaken in agriculture allows for both male and female
employment. No attempt was made to consider different skills categories because SA farm
labour is predominantly unskilled (Department of Labour, 2005) .
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Remuneration estimates for regular labour were computed from expenditure data gathered in
the Agricultural Census and Labour Force Surveys (Statistics South Africa, 2005). Annual
expenditure on wages included payments in kind, and were expressed in real terms with 2000
as the base year. The real average annual wage per worker (RWAGEt) was estimated by
dividing total real annual expenditure on regular wages by the number of regular employees
per year. The hypothesis of a negatively sloped demand curve for regular labour suggests
that PI < O. The price elasticity of demand for regular labour is computed from PI prior to
1991 (the threshold year) and from PI + P7 since 1991.
(ii) Real annual casualfarm labour wage rate (CWAGEJ
Casual labour in South Africa is considered to be a substitute for regular farm labour.
Whether for reasons of increased risk exposure or higher wages and transaction costs
associated with regular labour, the casualisation of farm labour is likely to continue (Du Toit
and Koekemoer 2003). In this study, the average real annual wage of casual labour was
calculated by dividing the real annual remuneration of seasonal labour per annum by the total
seasonal employment for each year. These data were obtained from the Agricultural Census
Reports (Statistics South Africa, 2005). Ceteris paribus, an increase in the real wage rate of
casual labour, which is a substitute for regular labour, should result in a decrease in the
quantity of casual labour demanded and an increase in the demand for permanent (regular)
labour, i.e. P2> 0 is expected.
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(iii)Real annual price oflabour contractors (CONTRA CJ
Farmers are expected to use more labour contractors as a way of reducing exposure to the
risk of industrial action. Contractors may be more easily replaced than permanent labour
from the farmer's point of view (Newman and Ortmann, 1996). Contractors are considered
as a substitute for regular farm labour. Ceteris paribus, an increase (decrease) in the price of
contractors should result in a decrease (increase) in the quantity of contractors demanded and
an increase (decrease) in the demand for permanent (regular) labour, i.e. ~3 > 0 is expected.
Unfortunately, time series data for prices charged by contractors were not available; this
variable was thus omitted from the empirical model.
(iv) Real annual interest rate (INTJ
The real prime overdraft interest rate was used as a proxy for the cost of capital (Pehkonen,
2003), including machinery and new technologies (Holly, 1999). An increase in the real
interest rate is expected to decrease investment in machinery and equipment, thus causing an
increase in the demand for labour, ceteris paribus. Therefore, ~4 and the cross-price
elasticity of demand for labour with respect to real interest rates should be positive. Nominal
interest rates were obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (2004) and converted into
real terms using the following formula (Watts and Helmers, 1979):
r' = (1 + r J-1
1 + f
where: r' = real interest rate, r = nominal interest rate, and f = inflation rate (CPIX)
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(v) Real annual price ofchemicals (CHEM)
Pesticides and herbicides for crops, and certain dips and sprays for animals, are considered
labour-saving technologies. Chemical prices were based on the price index for chemicals
and obtained from the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics (2005). These index values were
converted to real indices by dividing by the relevant CPIX indices (2000 = 100). Chemicals
are considered to be a substitute for regular labour, therefore, a decrease (increase) in the
price of chemicals should result in an increase (decrease) in the use of those chemicals and a
decrease (increase) in demand for labour, ceteris paribus. Thus, Bs and the cross-price
elasticity of demand for labour with respect to chemical prices are expected to be positive.
(vi) Real annual value offarm output (FARMOUTJ
Data on the real value of farm output were obtained from the Abstract of Agricultural
Statistics (2005) in the form of farm gross income. Annual nominal values were converted to
real values using CPIX (2000 = 100). An increase in the real value of output is expected to
increase demand for regular labour, ceteris paribus (Latt and Nieuwoudt, 1985). Thus,
FARMOUT t is expected to have a positive estimated regression coefficient (B6 > 0).
(vii) Labour legislation in SA agriculture (POLICYt)
Lewis et al. (1996) found that employment was already declining prior to the implementation
of new labour legislation in the farm sector in the early 1990s, and consequential increases in
risk, transaction and wage costs. For this reason, a piecewise slope dummy variable for
wages (POLICYt) was computed (see section 4.2.3). The price elasticity of demand for
labour for the post-1991 period (1991-2002) is estimated using the piecewise slope dummy
variable. It is anticipated that P7 < 0 as labour legislation has raised the cost of labour,
making farmers more sensitive to further increases in these costs.
(viii) Lagged regular farm labour employment (REMPLOYt_I)
The cost of farm labour is expected to increase as a result of labour legislation introduced
into SA agriculture (Vink and Tregurtha, 2003). Therefore, farmers are expected to adjust
the size of their regular labour force and an auto regressive scheme is used to account for
time lags in these adjustments made by farmers. For the lagged regular employment variable
(REMPLOYt_l ) Ps> 0 is expected.
4.3.2 Empirical OLS demand model
Equation (5) presents the structural demand model for regular labour in SA agriculture
estimated using OLS regression. CONTRACt is omitted because no time series data for
prices charged by contractors were available.
REMPLOYt = ~o + ~IRWAGEt + ~2CWAGEt + ~4INTt + ~5CHEMt +
~6FARMOUTt + ~7POLICYt + ~8REMPLOYt_l+ £ t ... (5)
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4.4 Simultaneous equation demand model (2SLS)
Wages are determined by the intersection of the labour demand and supply curves. A labour
supply function therefore needs to be included in a simultaneous equation demand model as
wages are determined endogenously. A simultaneous equation (2SLS) economic model to
estimate the demand of regular labour in SA agriculture is postulated as:
REMPLOYt = ~o + ~lRWAGEt + ~2CWAGEt + ~3CONTRACt+ ~4INTt +
~5CHEMt + ~6FARMOUTt + ~7POLICYt + ~8REMPLOYt_l









= Number of regular farm labourers supplied / annum
= Constant term
= Slope parameters to be estimated
= Real annual wage rate of regular farm labour
= Life expectancy of farm labour in years
= Unemployment rate (unemployed / population size)
= Residual error term
= 1.....43
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4.4.1 Choice of variables and expected coefficient signs in the supply equation
(i) Real annual wage ratefor regular farm labour (RWAGEJ
This variable was defined in section 4.3.1 (i). A positive sloping supply curve for regular
labour implies that ~9 > O.
(ii) Labour morbidity (LIFEXPJ
Statistics South Africa (2005) and de Waal (2003) report that in the past 15 years average life
expectancy in South Africa has fallen from 63 (1989) to 48 years of age in 2004. Since the
onset of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s, the epidemic has spread rapidly across South Africa.
According to Statistics South Africa (2005), one in four South Africans is HIV positive and
as many as 5000 people die every week of AIDS and related diseases. Moreover, the
incidence of HIV/AIDS is higher amongst the rural poor who supply most of the country's
agricultural labour (de Waal, 2003). For this reason, the supply equation includes life
expectancy (LIFEXPD (measured in years) as a proxy for labour morbidity in South Africa.
Decreasing life expectancy reduces the supply of labour to agriculture, suggesting that ~ 10 >
O.
(iii) Unemployment rate (UEMPOPJ
The burden of unemployment falls most heavily on labour force participants who lack job
skills. A high unemployment rate, as is the case in South Africa, suggests that the supply of
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unskilled labour to agriculture would increase as the availability of jobs nationwide
decreases. An increase in the aggregate rate of unemployment indicates fewer alternative job
opportunities and should therefore increase the supply of labour to agriculture. The rate of
unemployment is computed as the annual proportion of unemployed people in the total
population. A priori, PII is expected to be positive.
4.4.2 Empirical simultaneous-equation demand model (2SLS)
An empirical simultaneous equations demand model for estimating the demand of regular
labour in SA agriculture is postulated as:
REMPLOYt = ~o + P1RWAGEt + P2CWAGEt + ~4INTt + ~5CHEMt +
~6FARMOUTt+ ~7POLICYt + ~8REMPLOYt_l + et
RSUPPLYt = Po + P9RWAGEt + PIOLIFEXPt+ PI lUEMPOPt+ e,
. .. (5)
... (6)
where equations (5) and (6) are estimated using 2SLS to account for the endogenous variable
RWAGEt, determined by the intersection of REMPLOYt and RSUPPLYt •
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CHAPTERS
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the single equation and simultaneous
equation models proposed in chapter 4. Section 5.2 shows a piecewise demand function for
regular agricultural labour for the period 1960-2002.
5.1 Labour demand model
The reported t-values for the estimated structural coefficients were estimated using the
corrected standard errors. Estimated regression coefficients were tested at the 90%, 95% and
99% levels of confidence. The parameter estimated for FARMOUT t scored a t-value less
than unity and was thus omitted from the results. The estimated labour demand equations,
for OLS and 2SLS, are presented in Table 5.1.
55
TABLE 5.1: OLS and 2SLS regular farm labour demand model results, SA agriculture,
1960 - 2002
MODEL OLS 2SLS
VARIABLE B Beta ~ Beta
CONSTANT (~o) 321649,458*** --- 281441 ,631 ** ---
(3,245) (2,441)
RWAGEt -17,764*** -0,508 -15,317** * -0,437
(-3,951) (-2,669)
REMPLOYt_1 0,511*** 0,481 0,552*** 0,518
(4,558) (4,351)
CWAGEt 14,557** 0,225 12,777* 0,197
(2,319) (1,876)
INTt 4096 ,961 *** 0,201 4039 ,615*** 0,198
(2,884) (2,827)
CHEMt 75214,751 *** 0,144 76541,611 *** 0,146
(2,521) (2,55)
POLICYt -18,091 *** -0,259 -18,316*** -0,262
(-2,611) (-2,629)
Adj. R2 90,4% 90, 1%
F 65,291 *** 63,348***
d.f, 36 36







= Standardized regression coefficients
= Significant at 10% level ofprobability
= Significant at 5% level ofprobability
= Significant at 1% level ofprobability
Table 5.1 shows that the adjusted R2 values are relatively high, i.e. 90,4% and 90,1% for OLS
and 2SLS respectively. Both OLS and 2SLS demand equations are highly significant at the
1% level of probability. The RWAGEt variable is endogenous while the remaining variables
are exogenous to the function resulting in the instrumental variables having one more
variable than the explanatory variables, making the model over-identified. The Runs (or
Geary) test was statistically significant for regular labour at the 5% level of probability;
therefore, the null hypothesis of randomness was not rejected.
The estimated coefficients for RWAGEt are statistically significant at the 1% level of
probability, with t values of -3,951 and -2,669 for OLS and 2SLS, respectively. The negative
coefficient estimates (-17,764 for OLS and -15,317 for 2SLS) show that an increase in the
wage rate of regular (permanent) farm labour would reduce the quantity of regular farm
labour demanded in South Africa, ceteris paribus. The standardized Beta coefficients for
RWAGEt (-0,508 and -0,437 for OLS and 2SLS respectively) are relatively high, signifying
the relative importance of this variable in the models. The estimated long-run wage (price)
elasticity of demand for regular farm labour for the pre-1991 period is -0,25 for the OLS
model and -0,23 for the 2SLS model. For the post-1991 period (identified by the piecewise
slope dummy variable, POLICYt) , the long-run elasticity was estimated as -1,32 for the OLS
model and -1,34 for the 2SLS model. Likewise, the estimated short-run price elasticity of
demand for regular farm labour for the pre-1991 period was estimated as -0,12 and -0,11 for
the OLS and 2SLS models respectively. For the post-1991 period, the short-run price
elasticity of demand for regular farm labour was estimated as -0,64 and -0,61 for the OLS
and 2SLS models respectively. The coefficient for POLICYt is statistically significant at the
1% level of probability for both the OLS and 2SLS models. Conradie (2005) suggests that
the price elasticity of demand for farm labour in the Breerivier Valley of the Western Cape is
-0 3 but her demand model did not allow for a structural change in demand following labour, ,
reform. Latt and Nieuwoudt (1985) estimated the price elasticity of demand for farm labour
in KwaZulu-Natal as -1,39 over the period 1972-1978.
The coefficient of the CWAGEt variable is statistically significant at the 5% level of
probability for the OLS model and at the 10% level for the 2SLS model. The positive Beta
suggests that casual labour is a substitute for regular labour. The cross-price elasticity of
demand for casual wages is 0,05, which implies that a 1% increase in the price of casual
labour would cause a 0,05% increase in the demand for regular labour. The INTt (a proxy for
the cost of capital) coefficient estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level for OLS and
2SLS. The positive coefficient of INTt suggests that capital is a substitute for labour. The
cross-price elasticity of demand is 0,02, which indicates that a 1% increase in the real interest
rate would cause a 0,02% increase in the demand for regular labour. The coefficient estimate .
for the CHEM t variable is significant at the 1% level of probability for both OLS and 2SLS
models. The positive coefficient suggests that chemicals are a substitute for regular labour.
The cross-price elasticity of demand is 0,13, which implies that a 1% increase in the real
price of chemicals would cause a 0,13% increase in the demand for regular labour, ceteris
paribus.
The Normal Probability Plot of the regression standardized residuals showed no outliers or
abnormalities. Some multicollinearity was expected between POLICYt and RWAGEt, where
data in RWAGE t accounted for most ofPOLICYt . The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for
RWAGEt and POLICY t were 7 and 4 respectively, with a VIF value of 10 considered to be
the maximum. The remaining VIF values for the variables in the demand model were
relatively low (less than 4), suggesting that little or no collinearity existed between them
using OLS and 2SLS regression.
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the long-run price elasticities of demand for regular labour
for the periods pre-1991and post-1991 for OLS and 2SLS regression.
TABLE 5.2: Demand elasticities for regular farm labour using 1991 as the
threshold year, OLS and2SLS, SA agriculture, 1960 - 2002
REGR. OLS 2SLS
PRE* POST ** PRE* POST **
ELASTICITY
LONG-RUN Ej j -0,25 -1,32 -0,23 -1,34
SHORT-RUN Eii -0,12 -0,64 -0,11 -0,61
Notes:





Table 5.3 summarises the cross-price elasticities of demand for labour for CWAGE INT. t, t
and CHEM t in the demand model.
TABLE 5.3: Estimated long-run cross-price elasticities (Eij) of demand for labour
for selected explanatory variables, OLS and 2SLS, SA agriculture,
1960 - 2002
VAR. CWAGE t INT t CHEMt
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Eij 0,05 0,04 0,02 0,02 0,13 0,13
5.2 Piecewise demand function
quantity predicted (723 622) for the period 1960-1990. The graph shows an inelastic demand
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FIGURE 5.1: Piecewise demand function estimated for regular agricultural labour in
South Africa, 1960 - 2002.
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
There are many role players in the agricultural labour field in South Africa who wish to
promote better living standards for agricultural labour, including labour unions and
government. Labour legislation was introduced into SA agriculture for this purpose. New
labour legislation, however, has contributed to higher wage, risk and transaction costs for
farmers in South Africa. Farmers, therefore, consider substitutes (such as machinery,
contract machinery and casual/contract labour) to reduce costs.
Labour demand models estimated by OLS and 2SLS generated similar long-run pnce
elasticities of demand. In the pre-1991 period, the estimates ranged from -0,25 to -0,23, and
in the post-1991 period from -1,32 to -1,34 for OLS and 2SLSrespectively. Clearly, demand
for regular farm labour has become more price elastic since 1991. In the mid 1990s, farmers
may have adjusted the size of their labour force according to their expectations of future
changes in the cost of labour which may have result in the elasticities of demand for labour
estimated in this study over-estimating the true elasticity of demand for labour. Other things
being equal, it can be concluded that further increases in the real cost of labour will result in
substantial job losses for regular farm workers. In order to reverse the regular labour
unemployment trend in SA agriculture, the government could adopt more flexible labour
market regulations that would reduce labour costs and encourage farmers to employ more
labour.
Previous studies have also estimated the demand for farm labour in SA agriculture. Latt and
Nieuwoudt (1985) estimated the price elasticity of demand and supply for agricultural labour
in KwaZulu-Natal to be -1,39 and 5,18, respectively. Conradie (2005) conducted a localised
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study in the Breerivier Valley of the Western Cape where she estimated the price elasticity of
demand for farm labour as -0,3. Unlike these earlier studies, this study used piecewise linear
regression to allow for a structural change in demand for regular labour following labour
reform. It also uses an auto regressive scheme to account for time lags in the adjustments
made by farmers to higher labour costs, resulting in a dynamic model.
The results of this study show that wages paid to casual workers have had a significant
impact on the quantity of regular farm labour demanded. Labour legislation introduced in
the early 1990s has encouraged farmers to substitute regular workers with casual workers
because they command lower wages, incur lower transaction costs and expose farrhers to less
risk. However, the inclusion of all casual workers in minimum wage legislation from 2006 is
expected to slow the casualisation of agricultural labour as farmers turn to labour contractors,
chemicals and machinery as the next best substitutes. This study found that .a relative
increase (decrease) in the price of chemicals (pesticides and herbicides for crops, and labour
saving dips and sprays for animals) results in an increase (decrease) in the demand for
regular labour. The demand for labour is also sensitive to changes in real interest rates (used
as a proxy for the cost of capital). A relative decrease in the cost of capital encourages
farmers to adopt more machinery and equipment, causing a decrease in the demand for
regular labour.
The fact that farmers are adjusting .to relatively higher labour costs by reducing labour
employment on their farms means that unskilled workers lose jobs and poverty deepens in
South Africa. The demand for unskilled labour, which makes up the bulk of the agricultural
workforce, is likely to decrease as farmers replace this labour with new capital equipment
and lor contractors. By making use of contractors farmers are able to reduce regular labour
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on the farm which reduces transaction costs as they are now able to negotiate with one party
instead ofwith many labourers.
To counter the trend of declining employment in SA agriculture it is recommended that
government allow more flexibility in terms of the legislation regarding the hiring and
dismissing of farm workers, thus decreasing the transaction costs and time spent by farmers
dealing with labour employment issues. A shift away from the collective bargaining process
to accommodate personalised employment contracts and wage negotiations would reduce the
risk of industrial action and improve cost efficiency by rewarding more productive workers.
Government should also promote a quicker resolution of outstanding labour tenants' claims
which would reduce uncertainty for farmers. Minimum wages, if set above the market
equilibrium wage, are expected to increase the standard of living for those workers who still
have jobs. However, workers with fewer skills, who are inexperienced, or old, may well be
left without jobs, creating more unemployment and poverty in South Africa. In addition,
with the casualisation of farm labour in South Africa and casual labour being included in the
minimum wage legislation in 2006, it is expected that unemployment in the agricultural
sector will further rise as a result of increased labour costs. For these reasons, labour
legislation for the agricultural sector should be revisited. Minimum wages, in particular,
should be scrapped. Instead, government should invest in skills improvement to enhance
farm wages through higher productivity and increased competition with more skill-intensive
sectors of the economy.
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SUMMARY
In the past, labour in SA agriculture had very little protection in the way of legislation. The
main form of protection was through common law based on legal precedents set on past
judgments. Farmers started adjusting to labour legislation introduced in the early 1990s
before the country's first democratic elections in 1994. This legislation included the Basic
Conditions of Employment Act 104 of 1992, the Unemployment Insurance Amendment Act
130 of 1992, the Agricultural Labour Act (ALA) 147 of 1993 and the Occupational Health
and Safety Act 85 of 1993. Since the mid-1990s "new" legislation pertaining to agriculture
has been implemented in South Africa, and includes the Basic Conditions of Employment
Act 75 of 1997 (amended), the Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 (amended), the
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the Skills
Development Levies Act 9 of 1999, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, the
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 and the Sectoral Determination (an
amendment of the BCEA 75 of 1997) which includes the imposition of minimum wages.
Labour legislation is deemed necessary to enhance the lives of farm workers. Workers that
remain in agriculture will be better off as their living and working conditions, as well as
remuneration levels, are improved. However, a relative increase in the cost (transaction and
wage) and risk associated with labour motivates farmers to replace labour with machinery,
machinery .contractors, labour contractors or new technologies that are labour-saving,
resulting in a decreased demand for unskilled workers. The dismissed workers often move to
urban areas to seek employment.
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The long-run price elasticity of demand for regular agricultural labour in South Africa was
estimated in order to assess the appropriateness of labour legislation that has increased the
cost of farm labour since the early 1990s. Both a single equation (OLS) and a simultaneous
equation (2SLS) demand model were estimated using secondary data obtained for 43 years
(1960-2002) from Statistics South Africa and the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics. The
2SLS model included a labour supply equation. Both the estimated OLS and 2SLS demand
models included a piecewise slope dummy variable to allow for a structural change in
demand for regular labour following labour reform. In this study, 1991 was used as the
threshold year as significant policy changes were anticipated in the early 1990s with the
Basic Conditions of Employment Act gazetted in 1992. In addition, an autoregressive
scheme was used to account for time lags in adjustments made by farmers to the size of their
regular labour force following a change in the expected cost of farm labour.
The estimated long-run wage (price) elasticity of demand for labour for the pre-1991 (i.e.,
1960-1990) period was -0,25 for the OLS model and -0,23 for the 2SLS model suggesting
that the demand for regular labour was inelastic during this period. For the post-1991 period
(1991-2002), the long-run demand elasticity was estimated as -1,32 for the OLS model and -
1,34 for the 2SLS model, signifying an elastic demand for regular labour. The results show
that labour legislation has encouraged farmers to substitute casual workers for regular
workers (due to the fact that they command lower wages, incur lower transaction costs and
expose farmers to less risk) and that the demand for regular labour is also sensitive to
changes in real interest rates and the price of chemicals.
Policies on health (i.e. HN/AIDS, etc.) and education need to be enhanced. Farmers, for
example, could assist by implementing HIV/AIDS training courses and awareness
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programmes on their farms which could benefit the farm business in terms of higher labour
productivity. Government should allow more flexibility regarding the hiring and dismissing
of farm workers, thus decreasing the transaction costs and time spent by farmers dealing with
labour employment issues and possibly counteracting the declining .trend in agricultural
employment in South Africa. Individual contracts for farm workers, as opposed to a
collective bargaining process, would further reduce risk of industrial action to the farmer.
The primary goal of a minimum wage is to address income inequalities across various
economic sectors. The benefits of the minimum wage, however, only accrue to those
workers who still have jobs. Workers with fewer skills often lose their jobs, which could
lead to more poverty in South Africa. Government should, therefore, consider re-evaluating
the appropriateness of the minimum wage, particularly in the agricultural sector. Instead,
government should invest in skills improvement to improve farm wages through higher
productivity and increased competition with more skill-intensive sectors of the economy.
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APPENDIX 1
Empirical Data for Labour Demand Model
Year Re~ular Reaular* Rwa~e* Casual Casual* Cwaae* Int*
labour remuneration Labour remuneration
(Number) (R1000) (R) (Number) (R1 000) ( R) (%)
1960 756,397 2,534,040 3,350 591,882 1,085,680 1,834 -2,02
1961 865,408 2,332,851 2,696 688,417 1,056,000 1,534 -0,93
1962 872,784 2,008,310 2,301 769,789 1,206,000 1,567 -1,31
1963 781,539 2,038,593 2,608 699,854 924,000 1,320 -4,39
1964 756,581 2,035,171 2,690 675,489 931,371 1,379 -3,09
1965 725,468 1,944,666 2,681 658,469 903,487 1,372 -3,97
1966 714,568 1,991,560 2,787 621,548 958,146 1,542 2,73
1967 772,568 2,414,977 . 3,126 684,553 1,253,800 1,832 -1,14
1968 830,068 2,679,369 3,228 778,966 1,272,761 1,634 5,65
1969 792,563 2,562,061 3,233 768,954 725,041 943 1,39
1970 756,548 2,522,294 3,334 745,569 540,137 724 4,25
1971 745,748 3,139,236 4,210 770,265 620,436 805 1,07
1972 736,238 3,132,051 4,254 653,026 635,293 973 2,89
1973 726,768 3,421,163 4,707 627,463 674,328 1,075 2,69
1974 712,892 3,975,095 5,576 631,976 788,206 1,247 6,99
1975 715,863 4,563,907 6,375 615,111 920,723 1,497 7,58
1976 683,449 4,980,750 7,288 500,892 522,235 1,043 7,54
1977 679,193 4,924,486 7,251 517,697 721,803 1,394 0,21
1978 691,017 4,822,940 6,979 535,481 1,062,310 1,984 0,88
1979 685,932 5,112,557 7,453 495,531 1,028,221 2,075 -2,74
1980 669,086 5,104,870 7,630 483,679 950,250 1,965 -3,68
1981 618,990 3,988,528 6,444 450,065 70.5,880 1,568 -2,8
1982 616,532 4,208,755 6,827 452,631 1,171,916 2,589 2,71
1983 614,649 4,250,006 6,915 441,991 1,063,689 2,407 5,7
1984 728,683 4,428,106 6,077 482,316 1,085,212 2,250 10,18
1985 807,341 3,905,533 4,838 516,411 1,271,861 2,463 6,71
1986 816,660 4,462,963 5,465 534,781 1,849,704 3,459 3,58
1987 795,283 3,921,839 4,931 559,230 1,793,983 3,208 -0,6
1988 738,224 4,386,422 5,942 488,408 1,416,000 2,899 1,87
1989 724,439 5,108,493 7,052 469,872 1,192,787 2,539 3,05
1990 728,414 4,752,004 6,524 456,262 973,658 2,134 4,56
1991 702,323 5,131,112 7,306 413,239 1,393,610 3,372 4,27
1992 656,772 4,766,344 7,257 394,425 1,580,794 4,008 4,03
1993 647,839 4,832,584 7,460 491,588 1,626,232 3,308 4,89
1994 619,888 5,784,806 9,332 301,763 1,538,401 5,098 6,82
1995 601,888 6,425,747 10,676 289,074 1,876,870 6,493 7,86
1996 601,476 6,451,487 10,726 303,997 1,829,161 6,017 11,35
1997 568,531 6,129,406 10,781 337,150 1,827,820 5,305 9,78
1998 550,475 5,937,029 10,785 357,552 1,776,276 4,886 13,69
1999 532,992 5,750,689 10,789 379,188 1,718,896 4,500 14,53
2000 516,065 5,570,198 10,794 402,133 1,731,235 4,144 8,66
2001 499,674 5,395,372 10,798 426,467 1,705,043 3,816 7,85
2002 481,375 5,211,626 10,827 459,445 1,589,836 3,460 6,25
* Real values (CPIX = 2000)
7Q
Empirical Data for Labour Demand Model (Cont... )
Year Nominal Price Chem* Farmout* Policy Laqlab
Index (chem)
(2000=100) (R1000) (Number)
1960 4,8 1,92 34,004,960 0
1961 4,8 1,78 32,971,667 0 756,397
1962 4,9 1,69 32,631,724 0 865,408
1963 4,9 1,53 30,239,125 0 872,784
1964 4,9 1,4 28,523,571 0 781,539
· 1965 5,0 1,28 26,996,256 0 756,581
1966 5,0 1,22 26,248,927 0 725,468
1967 5,0 1,11 29,459,067 0 714,568
1968 5,1 1,11 26,313,696 0 772,568
1969 5,1 1,04 26,124,980 0 830,068
1970 5,3 1,04 25,346,137 0 792,563
1971 5,6 1,02 27,261,091 0 756,548
1972 5,9 1,02 29,850,241 0 745,748
1973 6,2 1,02 29,724,607 0 736,238
1974 7,3 1,16 42,346,841 0 726,768
1975 9,1 1,4 42,892,323 0 712,892
1976 9,6 1,41 43,971,059 0 715,863
1977 10,1 1,33 48,713,434 0 683,449
1978 11,0 1,31 48,043,107 0 679,193
1979 11,4 1,2 47,465,589 0 691,017
1980 12,9 1,19 54,909,861 0 685,932
1981 13,9 1,11 53,197,208 0 669,086
1982 16,7 1,17 53,686,958 0 618,990
1983 18,6 1,16 48,952,329 0 616,532
1984 20,4 1,14 49,019,061 0 614,649
1985 25,4 1,22 52,565,663 0 728,683
1986 31,5 1,27 46,075 ,538 0 807,341
1987 33,9 1,18 46,508,345 0 816,660
1988 36,3 1,12 49,923,583 0 795,283
1989 41,0 1,11 52,113,749 0 738,224
1990 45,6 1,08 47,637,653 0 724,439
1991 53,2 1,09 44,800,922 . 0 728,414
1992 56,6 1,02 39,724,154 -48,69 702,323
1993 59,8 0,98 42,032,356 153,63 656,772
1994 64,1 0,96 42,286,462 2026,11 647,839
1995 68,5 0,95 41,355,421 3370,06 619,888
1996 79,0 1,02 46,997,701 3420,17 601,888
1997 97,2 1,15 47,960,496 3475,21 601,476
1998 98,2 1,09 46,282,996 3479,36 568,531
1999 101,6 1,07 46,338,568 3483,53 550,475
2000 100,0 1,0 45,580,721 3487,69 532,992
2001 106,8 1,01 47,728,675 3491,85 516,065
2002 122,3 1,06 57,232,454 3520,62 499,675
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Empirical Data for Labour Supply Model
Year Rwage* Lifexp Unemployment Population Uempop CPIX
(R) (Years) (Number) (Number) (2000=100)
1960 3,350 49,4 94,038 13,214,369 0,007 2,5
1961 2,696 49,7 102,113 13,985,215 0,007 2,7
1962 2,301 50 101,254 14,625,124 0,007 2,9
1963 2,608 50,3 106,248 14,968,367 0,007 3,2
1964 2,690 50,7 110,268 15,124,021 0,007 3,5
1965 2,681 51,1 118,426 15,892,008 0,007 3,9
1966 2,787 51,5 124,380 16,785,639 0,007 4,1
1967 3,126 51,9 168,432 17,627,145 0,010 4,5
1968 3,228 52,3 193,267 18,471,912 0,010 4,6
1969 3,233 52,7 234,021 19,021,306 0,012 4,9
1970 3,334 53,1 251,430 19,211,124 0,013 5,1
1971 4,210 53,5 284,621 19,640,965 0,014 5,5
1972 4,254 53,9 . 342,061 20,080,487 0,017 5,8
1973 4,707 54,3 365,402 20,524,932 0,018 6,1
1974 5,576 54,7 398,624 20,980,124 0,019 6,3
1975 6,375 55,1 424,518 21,447 ,958 0,020 6,5
1976 7,288 55,5 498,621 21,921,015 0,023 6,8
1977 7,251 55,9 498,526 22,410,415 0,022 7,6
1978 6,979 56,3 512,497 . 22,907 ,982 0,022 8,4
1979 7,453 56,7 524,129 23,434,201 0,022 9,5
1980 7,630 57,1 540,213 23,994,309 0,023 10,8
1981 6,444 57,5 541,907 24,591,801 0,022 12,5
1982 6,827 57,9 547,354 25,215,014 0,022 14,3
1983 6,915 58,4 552,130 25,887,306 0,021 16,1
1984 6,077 59 567,507 25,564,958 0,022 17,9
1985 4,838 59,5 632,154 27,241 ,987 0,023 20,8
1986 5,465 60 756,204 29,874 ,210 0,025 24,7
1987 4,931 60,5 978,402 31,257,269 0,031 28,7
1988 5,942 61 1,161,237 33,248,874 0,035 32,4
1989 7,052 61,5 1,345,872 34,652,302 0,039 37,1
1990 6,524 63 1,689,021 35,873,316 0,047 42,4
1991 7,306 62 2,154,876 36,199,834 0,060 49,0
1992 7,257 61 2,654,879 36,992,951 0,072 55,7
1993 7,460 60,5 2,769,584 37,802 ,128 0,073 61,2
1994 9,332 59 2,903,154 38,631,506 0,075 66,6
1995 10,676 58,3 3,102 ,940 39,477,087 0,079 72,4
1996 10,726 57,4 3,302,618 40,342,892 0,082 77,7
1997 10,781 56,2 3,452,800 41,227,934 0,084 84,4
1998 10,785 55 3,163,000 42,131,078 0,075 90,2
1999 10,789 53,6 3,526,000 43,054,987 0,082 94,9
2000 10,794 52 3,706,571 43,686,124 0,085 100,0
2001 10,798 51 3,893,502 44,561,968 0,087 105,7
·2002 10,827 49,5 4,021,573 45,454,326 0,088 115,4
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